Cease-fires are hard to agree

29 Dec, 2017 - 00:12 0 Views

eBusiness Weekly

We conclude the story of the Lancaster House Conference this week, picking up where major agreement had been struck over the land rights question.

What next?

Having bilaterally agreed on the constitution, Carrington and Muzorewa’s delegation had continued to meet during the PF’s elaborate manoeuvring on the land issue.

The chairman had to run some unpalatable ideas past Muzorewa, including the fact that his government could not be allowed to run the country in the lead up to elections for fear of prejudicing the result.

Not liking the way things were going, it was Muzorewa’s turn to stall, hoping the PF would leave the conference, making the second class solution the only option.

It was probably with feelings of disappointment that Muzorewa rejoined the plenary sessions on 18 October, maintaining his government’s right and ability to run any forthcoming elections.

How did the transition plan turn out?

The PF were adamant in their demands for the creation of an 8-man council to run the country along with a UN peacekeeping force to oversee elections.

Their plan was to neutralise Rhodesian authority and increase their own power and control over the country. The UK, on the other hand, knew they had to exercise direct control to avoid the unwelcome ‘challenges’ of power-sharing arrangements.

Carrington therefore presented his transition plan on 22 October which envisaged a Governor, assisted by an election council and the military commanders from either side; the whole process would be monitored by Commonwealth observers.

The police, not any army, would be responsible for maintaining law and order. Much to the PF’s chagrin, there was an explicit recognition that there would be no changes to the administrative structures in the country.

What could they do about it?

The PF responded on 24 October with a plan of their own that sought to neutralise their greatest fear – the Rhodesian security forces.

Their major disagreement with Carrington’s plan was that it left the Rhodesian army intact. In fact, Zvobgo went as far as calling it “a recipe for a coup.”

The PF proposed that a governing council be created that would oversee the integration of the armies over a six month period before elections would be held. Carrington flatly rejected both ideas, insisting on full British authority for a minimum time.

How did Muzorewa respond to these proposals?

Surprisingly he accepted the broad outlines on 27 October – after extensive consultations and negotiations with his team – and his conscience.

As Davidow said, “obtaining from Muzorewa his agreement to step aside and transfer power to a British Governor proved to be the single most difficult task confronting Carrington”.

It was not an easy decision. It took the combined persuasive powers of General Peter Walls, CIO head Ken Flower and Air Vice Marshall Harold Hawkins to convince Muzorewa that this was the best course of action. When he stepped down in favour of the Governor in mid-December,

Muzorewa became the first ever nationalist African statesman to voluntarily surrender his power – and to a colonial, white Governor at that. Josiah Gumede, the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian President, did the same.

As Flower points out, Muzorewa had been elected to power (even if the election had been disregarded by the outside world) and as such had a right to remain in power until the conclusion of fresh elections.

And the PF?

Muzorewa’s resignation was still to come and negotiations limped along.

The Commonwealth and Frontline States supported the PF’s position and managed to induce some flexibility into the British position, forcing the UK to extend its commitment to include time for the ceasefire to take hold.

On 2 November, Carrington presented a 41-point transition plan that contained several bows in the PF’s direction. He agreed to have British police officers supervise their Rhodesian equivalents; all political prisoners were to have their cases reviewed immediately; refugees to be repatriated; all political parties to be unbanned; and Commonwealth observers to be granted full access.

The Zimbabwe-Rhodesia delegation signalled their acceptance on 5 November, tempered by a desire to give the UK and the rest of the world a reason not to renew sanctions.

Surely Carrington needed some legal backing?

An Act of Parliament in the UK authorising the creation of a Governor with full executive powers as well as to implement portions of the Zimbabwe Independence Constitution was needed. November 7 saw the introduction of the Southern Rhodesia Bill into the House of Commons.

This simultaneously angered the PF and pleased Muzorewa’s government as it showed that, if necessary, the British would take action without the PF; hints at the attractiveness of the second-class solution.

On 12 November, the Southern Rhodesia Bill was passed by the Commons 296 to 229 votes and a day later it was passed by the House of Lords.

Carrington also, made ambiguous statements about the future of the talks, saying on the 13th for example: “There will be no resolution of the problem if we accept that any party which refuses to put its electoral support to the test in elections held under our authority can decide unilaterally that Rhodesia should remain in a state of illegality” – hinting that Britain would recognise any government returned after an election supervised by the British, even if the PF did not participate.

How could they resolve this impasse?

The British kept up the pressure on the PF by continuing with their arrangements to assume direct control in Rhodesia.

On 14 November, the Southern Rhodesia Bill received Royal Assent while 16 November saw the British allow certain aspects of their Rhodesian sanctions – like a travel ban on Ian Smith – expire.

An important breakthrough was made when Carrington agreed that PF forces would be granted equal status with the Rhodesians thus paving the way for a conditional acceptance by all sides on the transition arrangements.

Cleverly Carrington had a private meeting with the PF leaders and told them he had a Cabinet meeting to attend immediately afterwards and needed an answer for his Prime Minister otherwise he would be pressured to move ahead with Muzorewa only.

The PF acquiesced after the addition of a single sentence stating their forces would also be required to comply with the directions giving them equal status with the Rhodesians.

The PF complained about being forced to “stampede” into undesirable positions to which British Deputy Foreign Secretary Ian Gilmour retorted: “This must be the slowest stampede in history.”

Surely the British pushed towards a secession of hostilities?

Carrington had a plan already prepared for discussion which he tabled on 16 November.

Among other things, it demanded the ceasefire be implemented immediately because both sides were known to have good communication abilities with their troops, able to pass on messages quickly. Movement of all troops was to cease while military operations were to be limited to self-defence only.

The commanders of the armies would be directly responsible to the Governor, who in turn would be advised by a Ceasefire Commission and assisted by a Commonwealth cease-fire monitoring force.

The PF, as usual, had their own demands not least the request for a thousands-strong Commonwealth peace-keeping force and the right to keep control of the areas they had already liberated.

The PF also demanded that all white civilians be disarmed, claiming that some 155,000 weapons (mostly automatics) were in private hands, which if true made white Rhodesians the most heavily armed civilians anywhere in the world at the time.

Specialist military units were also to be disbanded before elections and foreign troops – i.e. South Africans – were to be immediately withdrawn.

Unsurprisingly Carrington rejected these demands saying only British proposals would be discussed and amended if necessary.

Could they stop fighting?

The chairman tabled amplified ceasefire proposals on 22 November and asked for a reply by the 26th.

The British envisaged the creation of a ceasefire commission to comprise an equal number of military representatives, to be chaired by the governor’s military advisor. The ceasefire monitoring force would be dominated by British soldiers, augmented by forces from Australia, New Zealand Kenya and Fiji.

This was a canny tactical move as it undercut PF demands for a UN force while at the same time involving the Commonwealth in a manner likely to increase its commitment to a peaceful transition – and force the PF to a moderate position.

The British proposals saw the Rhodesian security confined to their bases before elections while PF forces would be required to congregate at 15 Assembly Points, located well away from the Rhodesians.

Muzorewa’s delegation announced their acceptance of the ceasefire proposals at a plenary session not attended by the PF.

Robert Mugabe signalled his team’s feelings in an interview published in the Financial Times, where he accused Carrington of an “arrogance tainted with racism” and declared that the foreign secretary “can go to hell.”

What was their problem?

Rightly, the PF were concerned about the security of their forces once they entered into the Assembly Points. Many of the details they raised clearly showed they could not accept British assurances about the level of control over the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian forces after the ceasefire.

Among other demands, they requested the air force be grounded, a new and independent police force created under the supervision of the Commonwealth and the demarcation of areas controlled by both sides.

The British rejected all PF demands but Carrington then released a flexible and detailed plan for the implementation of the ceasefire in an attempt to convince the PF delegation that it could work.

Again requesting the Commonwealth monitoring force be expanded, a PF spokesman said, to “make unnecessary the dangerous implication contained in the British proposals that the Governor will use one of the (combatant) forces against the other to enforce the ceasefire” (This would indeed happen in early January 1980).

Carrington was at low ebb, saying in a rare appearance at a press conference” “I do not despair of reaching agreement but I am close to despairing as I have been in the whole three months”.

Did it fall apart then?

There was too much momentum. On 3 December Carrington obtained an Order in Council from the British Cabinet allowing Thatcher to choose a Governor for the country.

At the same time, he introduced one giving the UK Government the authority to promulgate the new Constitution for Zimbabwe.

On 6 December, the Zimbabwe Bill was introduced into Parliament which would enable Rhodesia to be brought to independence on a date to be decided, and to make the necessary consequential provisions in the law of the UK.

Such developments, ostensibly merely clerical, were important for maintaining the momentum of the Conference and providing evidence of continued progress to all the participants.

And so?

The country heaved a sigh of relief on 5 December when it was announced that an agreement on the cease-fire had been reached – “in principle.”

Zimbabwe-Rhodesia’s Deputy Prime Minister Silas Mundawarara called the PF “our brothers” and said, ‘this cease-fire agreement is perhaps the most important part of the agreement’. Such optimism did not however, signal that an agreement had been concluded.

The next day saw a crucial meeting to decide the ceasefire arrangements including the date it would start, the deployment of the monitoring force and preparations for the assembly of PF forces. Proceedings ground to a halt once again when the chairman asked for details of force levels operating in the country.

The PF would not release such sensitive information although Rhodesian Intelligence estimated Zanla had no more than 15,000 soldiers and Zipra a little over 6,000.

Wasn’t Carrington gambling on a settlement by doing this?

Nothing showed this more than how he dealt with the Governor of Rhodesia. On 7 December, Lord Soames was appointed Governor for the interim period.

Though a seasoned diplomat, he had no African experience, assuring that he was not identified with any of the factions in the Rhodesian conflict.

This, of course, had the disadvantage that he did not understand the complicated nature of the country’s politics. Neither he nor his team were given any time to get to grips with the situation as Carrington sent them to Salisbury on 11 December, before any conclusive agreement had been reached.

Before leaving, Soames had received a reassuring pat on the shoulder from Carrington and the words: “Good on you”.

This was a huge gamble because, until the agreement was signed, Soames had no real authority in the country as the soldiers and police could simply ignore any orders he might have been foolish enough to issue.

The danger was that Soames, and thus Britain, was nominally responsible for everything that happened after he arrived.

So why do it?

Carrington aimed to give Muzorewa’s delegation a morale boost, because with Soames’ arrival on 12 December, Rhodesia reassumed full international legality and British sanctions were automatically lifted (the US and UN followed suit a few days later). Muzorewa’s government and Parliament had already stoically voted the night before to dissolve their existence so the handover was a mere formality.

Carrington also aimed to show the seriousness of British commitment to the peace deal and convince the recalcitrant PF that a settlement, if necessary without their participation was imminent and inevitable.

The PF were wonderfully unconcerned about any potential failure to reach an agreement as expressed by Zvobgo in the Financial Times who said it would simply mean “an all-out war with a British Governor in charge of Rhodesia.” It had the anticipated effect on Muzorewa who signalled his full acceptance of the ceasefire proposals on 13 December.

Two days later, Carrington and Mundawarara initialled the conference proceedings, in their view signalling the meeting was concluded and an agreement reached.

What was the problem this time?

The PF were concerned about the number and location of their Assembly Points (APs). They were initially granted 15, mostly located near the border. By contrast, the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia army had 90 visible bases throughout the country. This had the effect of skewing public perception of the dominant military control and authority within the country.

Significantly Josiah Tongogara publicly said he was unconcerned about the location of the APs since their nearness to the border would be an advantage if a retreat was in order.

The PF political leadership insisted on getting more though and Carrington finally offered a 16th AP while at the same providing a mechanism for the Governor to create more if the situation warranted.

How was this impasse broken?

Famously, it took an uncharacteristically blunt message from Mozambican President Samora Machel to overcome the last hurdle. On 16 December, he wired Robert Mugabe saying if he did not sign, he would be welcomed back in Mozambique where he would be given a beach villa and he could write his memoirs. In other words, as far as Mozambique was concerned, the war was over and failing an agreement they would withdraw all support for Zanla forces. December 17 saw Mugabe, Nkomo and Gilmour initial the conference report and ceasefire agreement. The next day, the Zimbabwe Bill received Royal Assent.

Finally, after three months of wrangling, the conference report and ceasefire agreement were signed by Carrington, Gilmour, Muzorewa, Mundawarara, Nkomo and Mugabe in a ceremony at Lancaster House attended by a beaming Margaret Thatcher. The agreement was bound in aquamarine-coloured leather folders with the Royal Crest on the front.

The signatories were given custom-made fibre-tipped pens to keep as a souvenir.

In one of those historical coincidences littering Zimbabwe’s history, December 21 is also the day many consider the liberation war to have started in earnest when Altena farm in the Centenary area was attacked in 1972.

Was this the end of the war?

Politically yes but practically – not quite. The ceasefire had seven days from the signing to take effect but all cross-border traffic was immediately prohibited and UN sanctions lifted.

The British immediately began a week-long airlift to move staff and equipment to critical areas around the country.

Fifty aircraft were used, ferrying over 5,300 tons of equipment and supplies including mine-proofed Land Rovers and 11 military helicopters. An aircraft landed at Salisbury airport every 40 minutes – it became the largest airlift in Africa’s history.

Enough tents and rations, for 500 people (donated by the US) were initially dropped at each AP, followed by the same again the next day. Recreational equipment – mainly sports gear – was also included to combat boredom in light of the anticipated 3-month enforced immobility before elections.

Over 10,000 hours of flying time were logged by pilots and crews. January 4, 1980 was the deadline for all guerrillas to enter the APs.

Mutual suspicion and disbelief of the ceasefire led Soames to declare that there was no question of surrender by either side but rather a “reciprocal disengagement to ensure equitable implementation of the ceasefire”.

Why did Carrington succeed where so many other attempts had failed?

The varying perspectives of the participants and observers means we have multiple interpretations of the question on why LHC was a success. Carrington certainly deserves his share of the credit, again proving himself as a good negotiator by maintaining control of the proceedings and never losing sight of the goals he and his team had set themselves.

Additionally, he was seen to favour each side on occasion which meant he was in a strong position to win concessions from both sides as one would be trying to win favours and the other trying to keep on his good side.

Carrington’s step-by-step approach was also a significant factor and was described by Davidow as the “gag and swallow method: take this piece, choke if you must, but accept it so we can move ahead”. This also helped to maintain momentum and contributed to the overall sense of progress.

His approach also usefully created watersheds in the negotiations which made it harder for each side to withdraw without losing major concessions so painfully won. Carrington also managed to bring in the supporting players (the US, African States, the UN, etc) at crucial times, using their influence over the participants to break deadlocks or seal deals which also helped create the illusion of UK impartiality in the proceedings.

Finally, he always had an ace in the hole – a BANTA – Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement. By being able to threaten to come to an agreement with only one side (Muzorewa’s), Carrington coerced the PF into agreeing on several issues that might have threatened the success of the whole conference.

Any missed opportunities at Lancaster House?

One early suggestion was to create Zimbabwe as a federal state which would have possibly meant a more equitable distribution of resources and a more enduring and energetic democratic system. Instead we ended up with a unitary state with a powerful central government, an inappropriate model for a heterogeneous society where competition for power is intense.

Quite possibly the federal system, allowing different ethnicities and ideologies to enter into competition for power would have been a far healthier situation. Alternatively federalism would have promoted tribalism and might have been too cumbersome and expensive a government for a small country like Zimbabwe.

From a theoretical and political perspective, the Constitution effectively blocked the vast societal restructuring promised by the PF’s rhetoric, creating an unstable situation with competing demands for (land) reform and respect for law and order. Such a “nervous condition” was not healthy for the government and may explain many of the initial problems experienced after Independence.

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