eBusiness Weekly
Martin Tarusenga
The information that high ranking officials in the Ministry of Finance (MoF) persistently hindered pensioners from securing their rightful benefits in various ways brings permanent secretaries, as administrative heads of ministries, in the spot light of macroeconomic performance.
The Herald article “Thumbs up to lean Government — Now for performance” reports incongruous methods used by MoF officials over the past eight years, including the recent meddling with Commission of Inquiry tasked to determine rightful pension benefits, sitting on investigation reports, appointment of Board members conflicted to the statutory regulatory objectives on the regulatory authority Insurance and Pension Commission (IPEC), use of opaque appointment procedures of the IPEC Board members, maintaining an IPEC administration incapable of calculating pensioner rightful benefits.
The hindrances have led to a drastic fall in domestic savings (investment) through pensions and insurance policies, and hence drastic falls in funds injection into the economy from this domestic source. The latter occurred as public confidence in the two industries has plummeted. The two industries are expected to be holding upwards of $18 billion from these savings, and circulating in the economy, stimulating economic growth.
To be sure permanent secretaries are the non-political civil service heads or chief executives of government ministries, holding these positions on a permanent basis (thus “permanent”).
Among other reporting points, Permanent Secretaries report to the Minister of this ministry.
The permanent employment basis is distinct from that of the minister who change on change of government or cabinet reshuffle.
The permanent secretary has distinct sets of responsibilities and accountabilities, which collectively with those of the minister are aimed at implementing government’s agenda.
The connection between the two distinct sets of responsibilities and accountabilities of the permanent secretary and the minister serve as the main conduit between the political and administrative worlds. According to some authors on the subject, Ministers on the other hand “. . . are both individually responsible for the affairs of a given ministry, and collectively responsible for the conduct of government as a whole (as spelt out by Cabinet). . .” i.e. the Minister, is the political head of a department, answering to the legislature, and in turn to the public through the legislature, both for his or her personal acts and for the acts of ministry subordinates. The success of the minister depends to a large degree on the ability and professionalism of a permanent secretary.
Unlike typical governance frameworks where the subordinate is appointed by the senior, the Minister typically does not appoint the Permanent Secretary, this to avoid disruptive frequent changes of civil service administration when there is a change in Government, or when there is a reshuffle. Permanent Secretaries in Zimbabwe for instance are appointed by the President. Apart from this apparent anomaly in Government governance, the Permanent Secretary has several overlapping accountabilities inter alia to the President, to the minister of the Ministry, for whom the permanent secretary provides advice and manages the department; to the head of the civil service, who on behalf of the government, confers collective responsibilities on permanent secretaries; to a management or Treasury board; to a public service commission, to the Parliament, through one or more parliamentary committees,
The Institute of Public Policy Research paper (Accountability and Responsiveness in the Senior Civil Service: Lessons from Overseas) notes that at the heart of debates about the relationship between Ministers and civil servants is a question about how best to balance two fundamental but opposing values, the one being the need for Civil Service to be sufficiently ‘responsive’ to the Government of the day, while at the same time, Civil Service must retain a degree of ‘independence’ from the political masters it serves if it is to ensure public services are administered and delivered fairly and legally to all citizens, irrespective of their political orientation.
The first value must be managed optimally to prevent a captured Civil Service, serving partisan rather than the national interest, while the second value must also be managed optimally to minimise the danger that the Civil Service become self-serving and immune to political leadership. With regards to the latter, a Permanent Secretary can for instance sit on a project assigned by the Minister and wait for cabinet reshuffle or the next general elections.
In Zimbabwe, the danger that the Civil Service becomes self-serving and immune to political leadership has been manifested in several instances, not least during the tenure of the inclusive Government of 2009 to 2013. The series of hindrances that pensioners have faced at the hands of MoF officials potentially serve as instances of self-serving and immunity to political leadership on the part of the incumbent Permanent Secretary. If the above narrative is correct, the incumbent Permanent Secretary has on the face of it persistently torpedoed political leadership instruction that pensioner rightful benefits be determined and entitled.
In the process, confidence in the pension and insurance industries continues to fall, domestic investment in pension and insurance instrument falls, the economy is stifled of this capital, defeating the President’s vision.
In a stance marking a new era under his Presidency requiring economic performance, the President has already held a meeting with the Permanent Secretaries and moved some of them. More permanent secretary movements may be necessary to achieve the economic performance the President is gunning for.
Martin Tarusenga is General Manager of Zimbabwe Pensions & Insurance Rights, email, [email protected]; telephone; +263 (0)4 797020; Mobile; +263 (0)772 889 716. Opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not represent those of the organisations that the author represent
